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BACK ON TRACK: HOW THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT GOT IT WRONG, AND WHAT LEGISLATURE CAN
DO TO FIX IT
I. ALL ABOARD - INTRODUCTION
According to the California Supreme Court, operators of roller
coasters and similar amusement park rides should be held to the same
safety standards that apply to buses, planes, and other modes of public
transportation.' The court's dubious 4-3 decision in Gomez v. Disney
means that when a lower court adjudicates negligence claims against an
amusement park, it will have to hold thrill rides to an utmost safety
standard, rather than the reasonable care standard, which would likely be
extraordinary diligence.2  On first impression, one might find little
difference between utmost care and extraordinary diligence. However, the
two standards significantly impact the level of liability for amusement park
operators. While extraordinary diligence holds amusement parks liable for
damages, the utmost care standard unjustly transforms these parks into
insurers of all their patrons.3
Given these two standards, amusement park visitors might initially
agree with the court's decision to elevate the safety standard; those who
engage in thrill rides would most likely prefer an amusement park to
conduct its rides with utmost safety. However, the inherent problems
caused by classifying thrill rides as common carriers outweigh any
perceived benefits of raising the safety standard beyond extraordinary
diligence. First, amusement park rides meet neither the statutory definition
set forth in California's Civil Code sections 2100 and 2101, nor its
accompanying legislative intent.4 Second, the court ignored California case
law by expressly stating that amusement park operators are not common
carriers.5 Instead, the court mistakenly relied on cases that focused on
recreational forms of transportation, such as mule train rides and ski lifts,
1. Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1136 (2005).
2. See id.; text accompanying note 8.
3. Id. at 1129 n. 1 (stating that a common carrier is liable for "loss or injury thereof from any
case whatever," with few exceptions).
4. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2100-01 (2006).
5. Simon v. Walt Disney World Co., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1162, 1162 (Ct. App. 2004).
2 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1
that are clearly not analogous to roller coasters.6 While these recreational
forms of transportation should provide calm and uneventful transportation
from one place to another, a roller coaster should provide hidden thrills and
jaw-dropping scares. Third, the court did not take into account that
ordinary negligence law already accommodates for the increased risk
inherent in thrill rides.7  For amusement parks, ordinary and reasonable
negligence should start at the heightened standard of extraordinary
diligence. This standard would meet the duty requirement that a park
exercise the degree of care in operating its thrill rides that is commensurate
with the dangers and risks created by that ride.8  Fourth, the common
carrier classification creates an unfair burden on California commerce.
Fifth, the vast majority of jurisdictions have adamantly opposed classifying
thrill rides as common carriers.9 Additionally, the court erroneously cites
to other jurisdictions it claims have agreed with California's stance on the
issue.10
Since accidents commonly occur at theme parks, amusement park
liability is a timely issue.'" Although accidents in amusement parks are as
common as cotton candy, serious injuries are rare.12 In fact, no serious
injuries were reported in 2004 at amusement park sites in California, with
more than 110 million rides given.' 3 In the United States, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") estimates 3,400 people were
brought to emergency rooms last year as a result of injuries sustained from
riding a fixed-site amusement park ride. 14 However, since accidents do
6. McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 205 Cal. App. 2d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 1962)
(finding common carrier status in a guided tour mule ride carrying sightseeing passengers over a
designated route between fixed points for a roundtrip fare); see also Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v.
Super. Ct., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1505 (Ct. App. 1992) (imposing common carrier status on a
chair lift carrying skiers at a fixed rate from the bottom to the top of the ski run).
7. See Hawk v. Wil-Mar, Inc., 123 A.2d 328, 330 (Md. 1956); Brennan v. Ocean View
Amusement Co., 194 N.E. 911, 913 (Mass. 1935); see generally Lausterer v. Domey Park
Coaster Co., 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 33 (1930).
8. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1158 (Chin, J. dissenting).
9. See, e.g., Harlan v. Six Flags Over Georgia, Inc., 297 S.E.2d 468, 469 (Ga. 1982); Lamb
v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Ut. 1993); Bregel v. Busch Entm't Corp., 444
S.E 2d 718, 719 (Va. 1994).
10. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1125 (2005).
11. Safe Kids USA, http://www.usa.safekids.org/tier3_cd.cfin?contentitem_id-22791 &
folder-id=301 (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
12. See id.
13. Cal. Attractions & Parks Ass'n, Common Carrier Case Before State Supreme Court,
http://www.capalink.org/news/commoncarrier.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter
CAPA].
14. MARK S. LEVENSON, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, AMUSEMENT RIDE-
RELATED INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 UPDATE 13 (2005), available at
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happen in amusement parks, the new utmost safety standard will have a
dramatic effect on the twenty billion dollars that amusement parks generate
in the state of California each year.'5
Before deconstructing the Supreme Court's decision, Part II of this
commentary offers a brief background on the theme park industry. Then,
Part III provides history and background on California's common carrier
laws, Civil Code sections 2100 and 2101, including a brief examination of
the legislatures' intent. Part IV presents the factual and procedural history
of Gomez v. Disney, the case that brought this issue to the forefront. Part
IV will also explain how the California Supreme Court's erroneous
decision will impact the parties in this case, and the twenty billion dollars
generated each year for the state by the amusement park industry.
Part V analyzes the court's flawed opinion in Gomez v. Disney. This
commentary will assert that the court erred when it classified thrill rides as
common carriers for the reasons explained above. Finally, Part VI will
suggest a remedy to the problem created by the court and will offer a
legislative solution through which legislatures could amend the statute to
exclude thrill rides from common carrier classification. This solution
would rectify the court's ruling, protect patrons of thrill rides, and prevent
the suppression of California's businesses.
II. AMUSEMENT PARK INDUSTRY
The amusement park industry consists entirely of fixed-site
locations. 16 Patrons pay an admission fee to the park and then have mostly
unbridled access to permanent rides, defined as attractions that are
permanently affixed to the site.' 7 Most often, the amusement parks have
one or more themes, hence the term "theme parks."'18 An amusement
park's attractions may range from bloodcurdling roller coasters with 200-
foot drops, to children's rides that slowly move passengers through rooms
filled with singing animatronics. Also included in the amusement park
category are water parks and fixed waterfront amusement centers. 19
Mobile sites contain mobile rides, which are attractions that vendors
http://www.cpsc.gov/library/amus2005.pdf (stating that although the CPSC does not regulate
fixed-site amusement parks, it gathers statistics in an appendix to provide continuity with past
reports).
15. Cal. Attractions & Parks Ass'n, http://www.capalink.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
16. See LEVENSON, supra note 14, at 4.
17. See id.
18. See Amusement Parks, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amusementparks (last
visited Oct. 10, 2006).
19. Id.
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move from location to location usually as part of a carnival, county fair,
street party, or other event.20 Mobile sites and mobile rides are not
synonymous with amusement parks, because mobile sites and mobile rides
face heavy regulation by the CPSC, which lacks jurisdiction over the fixed-
site amusement parks.2' Although the federal government currently lacks
jurisdiction over amusement park regulation, many states, including
California, have established their own regulations.22
The amusement park industry is shockingly massive. In 2004 alone,
169.1 million guests entered the gates of the top fifty parks in North
America. 3 The United States remains the largest market in the world for
amusement parks, with over ten billion dollars in revenue in 2004.24
According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers report, those revenues are
expected to increase to nearly thirteen billion dollars by 2009.25
The State of California is home to three of the top ten amusement
parks in North America, including the second most visited park in the
world-Disneyland, which has an estimated annual attendance of
13,360,000.26 Other large California theme parks include Disney's
California Adventure, which draws 5,600,000 guests per year, and
Universal Studios Hollywood, which brings in about 5,000,000 visitors per
27year. The California Attractions and Parks Association ("CAPA"), an
organization representing amusement, water, and family entertainment
parks throughout California, estimates the state's parks generate twenty
billion dollars in commerce each year. 8
While an accident at a theme park garners much media attention, it
rarely results in anything more than minor injuries.29  For example, in
California, the most recent large-scale accident occurred at Disney's
California Adventure on July 29, 2005, when twenty-five passengers
20. Levenson, supra note 14, at 2.
21. Id.
22. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 344.5(a) (2001).
23. James Zoltak, After Two-Year Slump, North American Parks Up 4%, AMUSEMENT
BusINEss, Dec. 13, 2004, at 14, available at http://www.amusementbusiness.com/
amusementbusiness/search/article display.jsp?vnu content_id= 1000736332.
24. Kevin Zimmerman, PWC: Theme Park Revenue to Grow by More Than 4%,
AMUSEMENT BusiNEss, Oct. 12, 2005, available at http://amusementbusiness.com/
amusementbusiness_/search/article display.jsp?vnu contentid- 1001 304651.
25. Id.
26. Zoltak, supra note 23, at 14.
27. Id. at 16.
28. CAPA, supra note 13.
29. Levenson, supra note 14, at 8 (citing results of in-depth investigations of accidents of
particular concerns to CPSC staff members. While these accidents are presumably more serious,
the typical injuries were cuts, bruises, and broken bones).
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sustained injuries after two roller coaster trains collided.30 The passengers
were transported to a nearby hospital, where they were all treated for minor
injuries and released.31
With any recreational activity, from daredevil extreme skiing to a
seemingly languid game of golf, there is always some risk of serious injury
or fatality. In 2004, four people died as a result of accidents at fixed-site
amusement parks.32 Later in this commentary, it will be proffered that
these four deaths would have occurred regardless of amusement parks'
common carrier classification. Four fatalities out of 169,100,000 visitors is
a ratio of one out of every 42,275,000, which makes the act of driving your
own car to an amusement park far more dangerous than embarking on a
ride once at the park.33 Understandably, some argue that four fatalities a
year are still four too many. However, raising the safety standard is not the
answer. Heightened standards will allow more lawsuits, but will not
decrease the number of fatalities. California amusement parks are heavily
committed to safety,34 and currently do enough to keep their rides safe.
III. BACKGROUND ON COMMON CARRIER LAW
Those engaged in the business of transporting passengers for profit
have long been subject to a higher duty of care.35 This policy stems from
an old English rule that held carriers of goods absolutely liable for the loss
or damage of such goods.36 In 1680, an English court expanded this rule
from carriers of personal property to carriers of passengers when it held a
stagecoach driver liable for not delivering a passenger to his final
destination as promised.37
As for American courts, legal scholars often credit Stokes v.
30. David Haldane & Dave McKibben, Brake Is Faulted in Park Crash, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2005, at B3.
31. Id.
32. Levenson, supra note 14, at 8.
33. Nat'l Safety Council, What Are the Odds of Dying?, http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/
odds.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (stating the odds of dying in 2004 as a result of an auto
accident were one in 18,412).
34. James B. Kelleher, Theme Parks' Liability Clarified, O.C. REGISTER, Jun. 17, 2005, at
10.
35. 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.14 (2d ed. 1986).
36. Joseph Henry Beale, Jr., The History of the Carrier's Liability, SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 148, 148 (Comm. of the Am. Law Schools ed. 1909).
37. Lovett v. Hobbs, 89 Eng. Rep. 836, 837 (1680).
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Saltonstal3 8 as the seminal case that extended the heightened duty of care
from carriers of personal property to carriers of people.39 In Stokes, the
court held that a carrier of goods was absolutely liable for the loss or
damage of such goods, but also recognized that carriers should owe a
heightened duty when transporting people. 40  The court wrote: "But
although he does not warrant the safety of the passengers, . . . [the driver]
shall possess competent skill; and that as far as human care and foresight
can go, he will transport them safely. 'Al
Two decades later, in 1859, the California Supreme Court established
that a carrier of persons for reward must exercise the highest possible duty
of care.42  In Fairchild v. California Stage Company, a stagecoach
overturned, causing injury to a passenger.43 The court classified the
stagecoach as a common carrier, and held that the operator owed a duty of
utmost safety to all of its passengers.44
As the use of carriages increased, so too did the number of
accidents.45 In 1872, the California Legislature responded by creating a
comprehensive statutory scheme governing carriages, which remains
unchanged today.4 6 Section 2100 states: "[a] carrier of persons for reward
must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide
everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a
reasonable degree of skill.",47  Section 2101 further imposes a duty on
common carriers to provide safe vehicles: "[a]carrier of persons for reward
is bound to provide vehicles safe and fit for the purpose to which they are
put, and is not excused for default in this respect by any degree of care. 4 8
While California courts have expanded the term "carrier of persons"
over time, they have always limited the expansion to modes of carrying
people for transportation purposes. 49  For example, in Treadwell v.
38. Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 181 (1839).
39. HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, § 16.14, at 506.
40. Stokes, 38 U.S. at 191.
41. Id.
42. Fairchild v. Cal. Stage Co., 13 Cal. 599, 605 (1859).
43. Id. at 601.
44. Id. at 602, 605.
45. See Elmo Shagnasty, Looking at the Law, ANVIL MAGAZINE, Oct. 1997,
http://www.anvilmag.com/farrier/lookinga.htm.
46. See James Zoltak, California "Common Carrier" Ruling Roils Biz, AMUSEMENT
BUSINESS, Jul. 5, 2005 at 41.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (2006).
48. Id. § 2101.
49. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 35, §16.14, at 511-12.
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Whittier, the court concluded that an elevator is a common carrier.50 In
Treadwell, an elevator in the defendants' store collapsed, injuring the
plaintiff passengers.5 1 The court held that the passengers in the elevator
expected a smooth transition during their transport to various floors of the
building.52  It is now well-established law that elevators and escalators
constitute common carriers.53 Since Treadwell, the California courts have
further expanded the common carrier definition to various forms of
transportation, including airplanes,54 buses,55 taxicabs,56 mule trains, 57 and
ski lifts. 8
IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF GOMEZ V. DISNEY
On June 25, 2000, Cristina Moreno rode on the Indiana Jones ride at
Disneyland. 59 The Indiana Jones attraction is a thrilling experience that
"consists of a dynamic ride vehicle which is used to enhance the sensation
of vehicle motion and travel experience by passengers in the vehicle. 60
The vehicle "move[s] along a predetermined path on a track,' 61 which at all
times stays within a building decorated with caverns, bridges, and
exploding pyrotechnics.6 2 During the course of the ride or shortly after
exiting the ride, Moreno suffered a brain aneurysm. 63 Moreno's family
contends she suffered serious injury, or at least her injury was exacerbated,
by the violent shaking imposed by the ride.
6 4 Disney denied this claim. 65
The injuries required extensive hospitalization and multiple brain surgeries;
50. See Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 585 (1889).
51. Id. at 576.
52. Id. at 578.
53. See Vandagriff v. J.C. Penny Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 579, 582 (Ct. App. 1964); 6 B.E.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 768 (9th ed. 1988).
54. Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 719-20 (1932).
55. Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 3d 780, 783 (1985).
56. See Larson v. Blue & White Cab Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 576, 578 (Ct. App. 1938).
57. McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 205 Cal. App. 2d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 1962).
58. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1505 (Ct. App. 1992).
59. Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1127 (2005).
60. Id. at 1142.
61. Id.
62. TheRaider.net, Indiana Jones Adventure: Temple of the Forbidden Eye,
http://www.theraider.net/information/attractions/forbiddeneye.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
63. See Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1127.
64. Anthony J. Sebok, The California Supreme Court's Ruling on the "Indiana Jones"
Ride: Was the Court Mistaken When It Treated the Ride Like a City Bus?, FINDLAW, Jun. 27,
2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050627.html.
65. Id.
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as a result, Moreno died on September 1, 2000.66
The estate of Christina Moreno and her heirs ("Plaintiffs") filed suit
against Disney and related defendants ("Disney").6 7 In addition to claiming
"causes of action for premises liability, 'product negligence', strict
products liability, and unfair business practices, '68 the plaintiffs also
claimed Disney had "common carrier liability," because the Indiana Jones
ride consisted of a vehicle "used to transport passengers while, at the same
time, providing them with entertainment and thrills.
69
Disney challenged the action on the grounds that its thrill rides are not
common carriers. 70 The trial court sustained the demurrer, and agreed with
Disney "that amusement rides such as roller coasters are not common
carriers [since] [h]ere, the primary purpose of the ride is entertainment,
thrills, and the incidental consequence is that people are transported in the
process. 71
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision. The California Court of
Appeal sided with the Plaintiffs, directing the lower court to overrule the
demurrer on grounds that Disney acted as a common carrier. 72 Disney
appealed to the state's highest court. 7 3  The California Supreme Court
granted Disney's petition for review and ultimately affirmed the Court of
74Appeal's decision to classify thrill rides as common carriers.
The Plaintiffs now plan to move ahead with their civil lawsuit against
Disney. 75 After this ruling, the Plaintiffs may unfairly benefit from a slam-
dunk case. The Plaintiffs will most likely win if they can prove the Indiana
Jones ride could be safer. The attraction is controlled by computers, so
Disney could always slow down the speed or even smooth out the sharp
turns. Disney could make the experience as smooth and uneventful as
taking a bus down a city street. Now that the Indiana Jones ride is
classified a common carrier, Disney may have no choice but to do just that.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
66. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1127.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1128.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1128.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1141-42.
75. Terence Chea, Amusement Parks Liable for Safety of Thrill Rides, State Court Rules,
SFGATE.COM, June 16, 2005, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2005/06/16/
state/ni 63227D85.DTL.
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GOMEZ V. DISNEY
A. The Court Failed to Consider Legislative History
The California Supreme Court has long held that the "objective of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent."
76
When statutory language may lead to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the court should "look to a variety of extrinsic aids,
including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied,
the legislative history, public policy ... and the statutory scheme of which
the statute is a part., 77  Since room exists for interpretation of what
constitutes a common carrier under section 2100, the California Supreme
Court compels courts to turn to the statutory intent.
78
Unfortunately, the majority in Gomez v. Disney does not adhere to its
own rule and fails to analyze legislative history in its opinion. 79 In fact, the
decision's dissent calls attention to this conspicuous omission.80 "When
the legislature passed these statutes in 1872, it almost certainly did not
intend that they would be applied to the kind of amusement park thrill ride
at issue here, and the majority notably does not assert otherwise., 81 The
dissent further explained that "[u]nder our rules of statutory interpretation,
this should be the controlling factor in deciding the question at issue
here.1
82
1. The Court Ignored the Construction of the Statute
When determining the statutory intent, the court must "determine the
legislature's intent when it enacted the statute" in question.83 Evidence
demonstrates that the legislature could not have intended thrill rides to be a
subject of the statute in 1872 because the necessary technology behind such
rides had yet to reach America. In fact, the first roller coaster in America
76. People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1007 (1987).
77. Id. at 1008.
78. See id.
79. See Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1142 (2005) (Chin, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. City of Burbank v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 35 Cal. 4th 613, 625 (2005) (emphasis
added).
84. A Short History of Rollercoasters, http://www.themedattraction.com/coaster.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2006).
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was not introduced until 1884, twelve years after the legislature passed the
statute.85 California's first thrill park opened to the public in Santa Cruz
more than three decades later in 1904.86
In 1872, the legislature understood carriers for reward to mean
stagecoaches, carriages, and the fledgling railroad. 87 In fact, the legislative
notes show the 1872 statute was triggered by a case involving a
stagecoach. 88 To identify common carriers, the legislature used a note
entitled, "Who are Treated as Common Carriers by the Courts of
California," which contained a list of common carriers, including:
stagecoaches, steamboats, steamtugs, railroads, and ferrymen. 89 That same
note states "Common carriers . . . [are] [p]roprietors of stage coaches, and
stage wagons, and railroad cars ... so are truckers, wagoners, teamsters,
cartmen, and porters, who undertake to carry goods for hire, as a common
employment, from one town to another.., or from one part of a town or
city to another." 90 Clearly a thrill ride consisting of a fast, turbulent, jarring
track that whizzes a passenger past audio-animatronics figures and
pyrotechnic special effects is far different from the examples listed by the
legislature.
2. The Court Failed to Consider the Purpose of the Statute
Two treatises claim that the purposes of sections 2 100 and 2101 are to
ensure the progression of commerce. 91 At the time that the statute was
enacted, the legislature realized the importance of railroads and steamboats
to the economy. 92  The expeditious moving of goods and commercial
agents from location A to location B served to stimulate the economy and
make regional businesses wealthier.93 The legislature wanted the utmost
safety for the movement of people and cargo so that there would be no
hindrance to economic growth in California.94 Moreover, the legislature
85. Id.
86. Charles Hillinger, Time Warp: Boardwalk Recalls Era When Life Was a Beach, L.A.
TIMES (San Diego County edition), Aug. 27, 1989, at 3.
87. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1144.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Code Commrs., notes foil. Ann. Civ. Code, § 2168, at 27-28 (1st ed. 1874,
Haymond & Burch, commrs.-annotators)).
90. Id.
91. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1145 (citing JOSEPH ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CARRIER OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS (1849); ISAAC REDFIELD, THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF
GOODS AND PASSENGERS (1869)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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labeled the statutory code section "Carriage," further demonstrating that, in
enacting the statute, the legislature had in mind the carrying of goods and
people .9 Clearly, amusement park operators are not in the business of
transporting cargo and people between various locations. Accordingly,
thrill rides do not influence the economy or bring wealth to the region in
the manner contemplated by the legislature in the enactment of sections
2100 and 2101.
3. Courts Must Give Statutory Language a Common Sense Meaning
When analyzing legislative intent, courts should give statutory
language a common sense meaning.96 As the court stated in Dyna-Med v.
Fair Employment & Housing Commission, "[s]tatutes are to be given a
reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent
legislative purpose and intent 'and which, when applied, will result in a
wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity."' 97  In determining a
legislature's intent, courts should also consider the consequences that result
from a particular interpretation.
98
Applying a common carrier standard "to conventional transportation
devices is completely consistent with the purpose and design of such
devices: to provide smooth, secure and uneventful transportation." 99 In
contrast, the purpose of thrill rides is to frighten and surprise the rider by
utilizing means that present the impression of inherent danger. Dangerous
elements are intrinsic to these rides, and passengers choose these rides for
exactly this reason. Some may argue that thrill ride passengers seek
imagined danger, rather than real danger. This argument falls short, since
passengers are not watching a movie about roller coasters; rather, they are
on the roller coaster. Imagined danger does not exist when a passenger is
plummeting 200 feet and speeding through extremely tight twists and turns
at velocities exceeding 100 miles an hour. The danger is real.
95. Id.
96. People v. Nguyen, 22 Cal. 4th 872, 878 (2000).
97. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1392 (1987)
(internal citation omitted).
98. In re Estate of Ryan, 21 Cal. 2d 498, 513 (1943).
99. Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1148 (2005).
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B. The Court's Misguided Approach to State Case Law Erroneously
Compelled Its Conclusion
1. Majority Opinion Ignored Relevant California Case Law
Although the court in Gomez v. Disney discussed section 2100, the
majority predicated its opinion upon California case law. 100 However,
while a few cases concede the point,'0 1 California case law does not
necessarily support the conclusion that roller coasters and other thrill rides
fall within the definition of common carrier. 1
02
First, the majority opinion failed to adhere to its own rationale in
People v. Duntley, where the court held that "the law applicable to common
carriers is peculiarly rigorous, and it ought not to be extended to persons
who have not expressly assumed that character, or by their conduct and
from the nature of their business justified the belief on the part of the public
that they intended to assume it.' 0 3 Undoubtedly, Disney did not expressly
assume the character of a common carrier when operating its Indiana Jones
ride. Disney never held out to visitors that this attraction is a public mode
of transportation. Moreover, neither Disney's conduct nor the nature of the
business would justify a belief that Disney intended to assume the
classification of common carrier.
Second, the court's flawed majority opinion failed to consider its
previous holding in McCordic v. Crawford, where the court ruled on the
standard of liability for "[a] proprietor, or one who operates a place of
amusement.' 0 4  In McCordic, an injured plaintiff obtained a judgment
against the operator of a thrill ride called the "Loopa."' 0 5 The court held
that the proprietors, or those who operate a place of amusement, are held to
the ordinary negligence standard of care, rather than the utmost standard of
care that applies to common carriers under California Civil Code section
2100.106 The McCordic court reasoned that, under negligence law,
operators of amusement rides are akin to any other business that invites
guests onto their property for financial gain and, accordingly, owe a duty of
100. Id. passim.
101. See Kohl v. Disneyland, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 780 (Ct. App. 1962); see also Barr v.
Venice Giant Dipper Co., 138 Cal. App. 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1934).
102. See People v. Duntley, 217 Cal. 150, 164 (1932); see also McCordic v. Crawford, 23
Cal. 2d 1, 6-7 (1943); see also Potts v. Crafts, 5 Cal. App. 2d 83, 84 (Ct. App. 1935).
103. Duntley, 217 Cal. at 164; Samuelson v. Pub. Util. Com., 36 Cal. 2d 722, 730 (1951).
104. McCordic, 23 Cal. 2d at 6.
105. Id. at 3-4.
106. Compare McCordic, 23 Cal. 2d at 6-7, with CAL. CtV. CODE § 2100 (2005).
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care to those guests.'0 7  The majority opinion in Gomez distinguished
McCordic by claiming the case "did not address the duty of care of the
operator of an amusement park."' 0 8 The majority in Gomez is incorrect,
because McCordic cited opinions from other jurisdictions to show that it is
well-settled law that owners and operators of amusement parks are required
to exercise the measure of care owed to invitees, including the reasonable
care in the construction, maintenance, and management of the ride. 109
Furthermore, in Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., a
California appellate court applied what seemed to be a heightened
reasonable care standard, rather than the utmost safety standard, in a case
involving an accident on a thrill ride called "tilt-a-whirl." ' 10 In Davidson, a
girl sustained an injury during the course of the ride."' The court held that
"[an amusement park] is required to maintain in a reasonably safe
condition, every contrivance used in its premises, and to properly inspect
and supervise the same .... [It is their] further duty to use reasonable care
to see that [passengers] were not injured while the tilt-a-whirl was
running."1 2 Finally, in Potts v. Crafts, a California court stated that "[t]he
proprietor of a public place of amusement owes to his patrons the duty of
using ordinary or reasonable care to see that they are not injured."
'"13
2. The Majority Opinion Felt Persuaded by Cases Not on Point or Lacking
Even a Minimal Analysis
The majority opinion in Gomez v. Disney emphasized three California
cases that concluded roller coasters and other similar attractions are
common carriers."14Although the cases cited by the majority opinion do in
fact classify a recreational ride as a common carrier, 1 5 these cases are
either not on point or lack the proper analysis for their findings.
First, in McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, the operator of a
107. McCordic, 23 Cal. 2d at 6-7.
108. Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1136-37 n.5 (2005).
109. See McCordic, 23 Cal. 2d at 6-7.
110. Davidson v. Long Beach Pleasure Pier Co., 99 Cal. App. 2d 384, 385-87 (Ct. App.
1950).
111. Id. at 386.
112. Id. at 387.
113. Potts v. Crafts, 5 Cal. App. 2d 83, 84 (Ct. App. 1935).
114. Gomez v. Super. Court (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1132-33 (2005).
115. McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 205 Cal. App. 2d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 1962);
Barr v. Venice Giant Dipper Co., 138 Cal. App. 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1934); Kohl v. Disneyland,
Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 780, 784 (Ct. App. 1962).
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guided mule train that took paying passengers on a roundtrip from Palm
Springs to Tahquitz Falls was found to be a common carrier.' 1 6 The Court
of Appeal reasoned that "a person who paid a roundtrip fare for the purpose
of being conducted by mule over the designated route between fixed
termini, purchased a ride.., and that the transaction between them
constituted an agreement of carriage."' 7 McIntyre is inapposite because,
for the purposes of determining whether the common carrier rule should
apply, there are several differences between a desert mule train ride and a
roller coaster. One, the purpose of engaging in this desert mule ride is
extremely different from the purpose of boarding a roller coaster.
Passengers embarked on the mule ride in order to experience a traditional
method of transportation to the main attraction, which was Tahquitz Falls.
The mule riding was incidental to the primary objective, which was to view
Tahquitz Falls. In contrast, the purpose of riding on a roller coaster is to
have a thrilling experience while being dropped hundreds of feet, and
turned upside-down several times, at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour.
Two, the expectation for riding in a mule train is that of a smooth,
uneventful, and methodical passage through the desert. The expectation of
riding a roller coaster is therefore the exact opposite of that of the mule
train, as the roller coaster passenger desires a jarring, eventful, and chaotic
experience. In fact, the more chaotic, the better! Three, the mule train,
although it exists in a recreational context, is set up to transport passengers.
The mule train carried passengers from Palm Springs to Tahquitz Falls, 18 a
journey of several miles." 9  A typical roller coaster tends to move
passengers around for about two to three minutes, but generally does not
provide transportation to alternate locations. So, the court in McIntyre was
incorrect in analogizing a mule train to a roller coaster.
Second, in Barr v. Venice Giant Dipper Co., the operator of a roller
coaster that "was in the nature of a miniature scenic railway consisting of a
train of small cars constructed to carry two passengers each" was a
common carrier. 2  The court opined that "[t]he owner and operator of a
scenic railway in an amusement park is subject, where he has accepted
passengers on such railway for hire, to the liabilities of a carrier of
passengers generally." 12  Barr is unpersuasive for two reasons. One, the
116. McIntyre, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 492.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 490.
119. David Lansing, Tahquitz Canyon, SUNSET, Feb. 2006, available at http://www.sunset
com/sunset/travel/califomia/article/0,20633,1143706,00.html.
120. Barr, 138 Cal. App. at 563-64.
121. Id. at 564.
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issue before the court was not whether the attraction was a common carrier,
but rather what sort of liability the owner and operator faced.'22 The Barr
opinion contains little discussion about the attraction's common carrier
status, and accordingly it is a mistake for the court to cite. Two, it is
unclear if this attraction is a scenic railway or a roller coaster. If it is a
scenic railway, then it should be considered a common carrier, even if it is
in the context of an amusement park. A scenic railway, like a mule train
ride, is differentiated from a roller coaster.
Third, in Kohl v. Disneyland, Inc., the operator of a stagecoach ride
within the context of an amusement park was a common carrier.' 23 In
Kohl, the plaintiffs were riding on "The Surrey with the Fringe on Top"
attraction, which was a horse-drawn carriage. 124  "While carrying
passengers, the horses became alarmed and ran, causing the carriage to tip
over. 25  The court stated that "[b]ecause of the passenger-carier
relationship between the parties, the duty imposed upon the defendant was
to exercise the utmost care."'1 26 Yet, Kohl offers little support for the
majority's holding in Gomez v. Disney for several reasons. One, although
the attraction is in an amusement park, it perfectly matches the common
carrier definition set forth in section 2 100.127 To further illustrate the point,
the legislative history of section 2100 lists stagecoaches and horse drawn
carriages as common carriers.128 Hence, the stagecoach in Kohl is not a
thrill ride, but rather a traditional form of transportation not relevant to this
discussion. The Indiana Jones ride, just like all thrill rides, does not
resemble a stagecoach. Two, the issue before the Court of Appeal was
whether there was "substantial evidence" to support the jury's verdict in the
lower court.' 29  In answering this question, the court asserted that a
"passenger-carrier relationship" existed between the plaintiffs and
Disneyland. 130  However, the court provided no analysis to support this
assertion. "These analytical omissions may have resulted from the case's
procedural posture and the parties' contentions; Disneyland did not raise
the issue on appeal, probably because it won in the trial court and was
defending the verdict on appeal based only on the adequacy of the
122. See id.
123. Kohl v. Disneyland, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 780, 780-84 (Ct. App. 1962).
124. Id. at 782.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 784.
127. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (2004).
128. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (1874); see also Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1144 (noting that
stagecoaches are listed as common carriers).
129. Kohl, 201 Cal. App. 2d at 784.
130. Id. at 787.
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evidence."1 3 1 Thus, it is a grave error for the majority in Gomez to use the
Kohl case as authority since the proposition of whether thrill rides are
common carriers was never considered by the court, and accordingly the
majority opinion is incomplete.
132
The majority was also persuaded by Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc.,
where a federal district court construing California law classified a
Disneyland attraction as a common carrier,1 33 but this case should not have
persuaded the California Supreme Court in Gomez. The analysis from the
federal court is only one page long and lacks even a minimal explanation of
the reasoning behind its conclusion. Indeed, its lone rationale is that "the
California statutory common carrier definition is very broad. Any
narrowing of that definition must be for the legislature and not the
court.' 34 The court in Neubauer even acknowledged that amusement park
rides arguably were not contemplated by the common carrier theory.
135
Therefore, the California Supreme Court should not have relied on
Neubauer.
C. The Court Did Not Take into Account That Ordinary Negligence Law
and State Regulations Already Accommodate for Thrill Ride Dangers
1. Negligence Law 101
A majority of courts have held that standard negligence law is
comprehensive and forceful enough to handle issues related to amusement
park rides. In most states, courts have held that the standard of care
required of amusement ride operators is the care that reasonable and
prudent persons would exercise under the circumstances. 36 This standard
requires an amusement park to exercise a degree of care in operating a thrill
131. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1152-53 (Chin, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 27 Cal. 4th 1161, 1176 (2002) ("[I]t is axiomatic that cases
are not authority for propositions not considered.").
133. Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 672, 673 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The majority of courts that have decided this issue have applied this general rule. See,
e.g., Sergermeister v. Recreation Corp. of Am., 314 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 297 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 1982); Rivere v. Thunderbird, 353 So. 2d
346, 347 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 25 (N.H. 1984);
27A AM. JUR. 2D Entertainment and Sports Law § 90 (1996); J.H. Cooper, Annotation, Liability
of Owner, Lessee, or Operator for Injury or Death on or near Loop-o-plane, Ferris Wheel,
Miniature Car, or Similar Rides, 86 A.L.R. 2D 350 (1962); F.M. English, Annotation, Liability to
Patron of Scenic Railway, Roller Coaster, or Miniature Railway, 66 A.L.R. 2D 689 (1959).
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ride commensurate with the dangers and risks created by that particular
ride. '37
Accordingly, what constitutes reasonable care varies "in proportion to
the danger to be avoided and the consequences that might reasonably be
anticipated., 138  Furthermore, "in the exercise of ordinary care.., the
amount of caution required by the law increases, as does the danger that
reasonably should be apprehended.' 39  Since roller coasters and other
similar attractions are inherently dangerous, the law already demands a
higher standard of care. The operators must act in a reasonable manner to
ensure safety of the riders. As the foreseeable risk increases, so does the
duty of care. Since these are machines that often involve fast speeds,
sudden drops, and young children as patrons, operators face an extremely
high duty of care, often referred to as extraordinary diligence. 140  As
Prosser and Keaton noted:
[I]f the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible consequences are
serious, the question is not one of mathematical probability alone. The
odds may be a thousand to one that no train will arrive at the very moment
that an automobile is crossing a railway track, but the risk of death is
nevertheless sufficiently serious to require the driver to look for the train
and the train to signal its approach. It may be highly improbable that
lighting will strike at any given place or time; but the possibility is there,
and it may require precautions for the protection of inflammables. As the
gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its
occurrence need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution.141
Instead of the court classifying every roller coaster and similar
attraction as a common carrier, the court should have turned to existing
law. Using Prosser's definition above, the court should not have looked to
the probability of an injury as a result of riding a thrill ride, but should
rather look at the gravity of harm that could occur should an accident
happen. As such, the court should have held that the elevated gravity of
harm creates a high duty of care. For example, a thrill ride involving a
100-foot drop and speeds exceeding ninety miles per hour will impose a
substantially high duty of care. Even if the probability of injury on this
fictional ride is low, the gravity of harm, should an injury occur, remains
elevated. Accordingly, the duty of care is already substantially high and
137. E.g., Sergermeister, 314 So. 2d at 628.
138. Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 317 (1955).
139. Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal. 2d 325, 328 (1955).
140. For an example of "extraordinary diligence," see Sergerneister, 297 S.E.2d at 469.
141. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 171
(5th ed. 1984).
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does not need to be elevated further to common carrier status.
2. Closer Look at Theme Park Safety
The California Supreme Court in Gomez arguably contorted the
definition of common carrier because it felt thrill rides need to be safer.
142
The decision may have been influenced by the widespread media attention
to an unfortunate situation at a Florida theme park where a four-year old
boy died after riding a thrill ride. 143 In addition, the justices may have ruled
in response to local coverage of a fatal accident on Disney's Big Thunder
Mountain Railroad thrill ride in the Anaheim park. 144  Although these
incidents were tragic, they were unusual.
Even if the court felt it necessary to contort a statute to protect patron
safety, statistics show that thrill rides in California are actually extremely
safe. 145  In fact, in 2004, Southern California had three hundred fifty
reported accidents at thrill parks, but none resulted in serious injury or
death. 146 Three hundred fifty minor injuries 147 in an industry of 110 million
individual rides 148 is an acceptably low statistic.
As mentioned above, the last fatality in Southern California occurred
at Disneyland on the Big Thunder Mountain Railroad attraction in 2003.49
In that case, the state blamed the accident on faulty maintenance,' 50 which
is a breach of extraordinary diligence. Here, Disney would be, and should
be, liable, and the victims of this tragedy should likely recover damages
without placing common carrier status on Disney or an utmost care
standard of care. This illustrates how deserving plaintiffs have a remedy
against negligent ride operators, regardless of common carrier
classification.
A day at an amusement park should not end in death and it is the job
of courts and legislature to ensure the public's safety. As mentioned
142. See Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1149 (2005) (Chin, J.,
dissenting).
143. See Maura Dolan & Kimi Yoshino, High Court Raises Bar for Safety of Thrill Rides,
L.A. TTMES, June 17, 2005, at A 1.
144. Man Killed in Roller Coaster Accident at Disneyland, CNN.coM, Sept. 5, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/West/09/05/coaster.accident.ap.
145. See News Brief, Cal. Attractions & Park Ass'n, Common Carrier Case Before State
Supreme Court (Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.capalink.org/news/commoncarrier.html.
146. Dolan & Yoshino, supra note 143, at Al.
147. Id.
148. Cal. Attractions & Parks Ass'n, supra note 145.
149. Dolan & Yoshino, supra note 143, at AI.
150. Disneyland Takes Responsibility in Roller Coaster Death, NBC4.TV, Dec. 2, 2005,
http://www.nbc4.tv/news/5453261/detail.html.
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earlier, four fatalities occurred nationwide at amusement parks in 2004.151
Two of these fatalities occurred at water parks: the first victim was "[a]
[four]-year-old boy... [who] [l]ifeguards found.., floating in five feet of
water" at Water Works in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio; 152 while the second victim
was "[a] [nineteen]-year-old man [who] drowned at Lake Quassapaug
Amusement Park in Middlebury, Connecticut."'1 53 The nineteen-year-old
man was a camp counselor who "was reportedly a good swimmer."'
' 54
Although both deaths were extremely tragic, they would have occurred
even if the respective states had classified thrill rides as common carriers.
The other two fatalities in 2004 occurred on roller coasters. In the
first incident, a passenger died after falling out of a Superman-themed
roller coaster at Six Flags New England, in Agawam, Massachusetts.
55
The decedent's family told the press that the decedent suffered from
advanced cerebral palsy and was "sickly and handicapped."' 156  Family
members felt the park never should have allowed the decedent on the roller
coaster in the first place. 157 In response, a Six Flags official stated, "[T]he
federal Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits parks from preventing
disabled people from boarding amusement ride as long as they are able to
board without assistance from park personnel."' 58  Although it remains
unclear how the decedent fell from the ride, a state investigation
determined that the ride did pass state inspections and allowed the ride to
reopen. 159 While questions remain in this unusual case, a certainty persists
that forcing a common carrier standard upon this ride would not have
prevented this accident from occurring.
In the second fatality, a man died after having surgery the day after he
was involved in an accident on the "Revenge of the Mummy" ride at
Universal Studios in Orlando, Florida.' 60  In this incident, the man was
151. LEVENSON, supra note 14, at 8.
152. RideAccidents.com, Boy, 4, Dies From Water Park Injuries, http://www.rideaccidents.
com/2004.html#jul6 (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
153. RideAccidents.com, Teen Drowns at Connecticut Amusement Park, http://www.
rideaccidents.com/2004.html#jul 16 (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
154. id.
155. RideAccidents.com, Man Killed in Fall from Intamin's Superman Ride of Steel Roller
Coaster at Six Flags New England, http://www.rideaccidents.com/2004.html#maylb (last visited
Nov. 20, 2006).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Man Dies After Fall While Boarding Theme Park Ride, LOCAL6.COM, Sept. 23, 2004,
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boarding the roller coaster when he slipped from the platform and fell four
feet, banging his abdomen and head on the side of the tracks. 161 The man
remained conscious the whole time following the accident, and scheduled
for surgery the following day. 162  During surgery, the man died on the
operating table due to complications from a previous stomach ailment.
163
Although unfortunate, this fatality originated from a slip and fall that could
have occurred on any business premises. As an invitee, there is a
heightened level of duty to protect people. Consequently, Universal
Studios may be liable, but either way, classifying the Mummy ride as a
common carrier would not have further protected this individual.
3. New State Regulations Now Exist
In late 2001, the state legislature enacted tough regulations governing
amusement rides operated anywhere in the State of Califomia.1 64 Many
states have no such regulations, 165 including Florida, which has the largest
amusement park industry in the country. 166 Section 344.5 of the California
Code of Regulations expressly limits the application of these regulations to
permanent rides in amusement parks and expressly excludes all other
potential attractions, from playgrounds to hot air balloons.1 67 The new law
provides that each new permanent amusement ride must pass a demanding
and comprehensive inspection "before the ride is placed in operation and
opened to the public.' 68  For all existing rides, the law requires annual
inspections that "include both a structural inspection and an operational
inspection.', 169 The state requires record keeping in conjunction with each
permanent ride, and will conduct audits of the paperwork. 70 The records
shall include, but are not limited to, "records of accidents, records of
employee training, and records of maintenance, repair, and inspection of
the ride."'171  Moreover, the state regulations require an unannounced
http://www.local6.com/print/3752688/detail.html.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. RideAccidents.com, Woman Injured at Universal Studios' Mummy Roller Coaster,
http://www.rideaccidents.com/2004.html#sep23 (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
164. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, §§ 344.5-344.17 (2001).
165. SaferParks.org, Inventory of State Amusement Ride Safety Regulations (Sept. 1,
2006), http://www.saferparks.org/database/stateinventory.php.
166. See Zoltak, supra note 23, at 14, 16.
167. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 344.5 (2001).
168. Id. § 344.8(a).
169. Id. § 344.8(c)(3).
170. Id. § 344.8(d)(1).
171. Id.
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inspection during park hours.172
If the state inspector "determines that a permanent amusement
ride.., presents an imminent hazard or is otherwise unsafe for patrons,"
the state may shut down the ride. 173 Moreover, operation of the ride will
not be restored "until the conditions cited in the Order Prohibiting
Operation have been corrected and approved."' 74  The court did not
consider the state's control over the parks. 175 These relatively new arduous
requirements clearly push operators into a higher level of care for their
rides. Even if the court incorrectly deemed California's amusement parks
unsafe, it should have at least considered that the legislature recently dealt
with the issue and should have allowed more time to see what affects these
laws would have on amusement parks.
D. California Business Will Unfairly Suffer Due to the State Supreme
Court's Flawed Ruling in Gomez v. Disney
1. California Amusement Parks Will Lose Business to Parks from Other
States
The amusement park industry is highly competitive 76 and each park
must build an even more thrilling attraction each year to keep visitors
coming. In 2005, new attractions opened across the country that featured
the "fastest coaster in the country," "steepest drop in the country," and the
"highest loop in the country.' ' 177 Amusement parks are constantly
competing with each other's attractions to keep people paying the
admission price in order to stay in business. Now that California has
classified thrill rides as common carriers, the state's theme parks will most
likely have to scale back the thrills in order to maintain utmost safety.
Moreover, many parks might have to alter or even remove some of the
more intense thrill rides since the liability for those rides is too high.
It will become economically unfeasible for amusement parks in
California to build new and exciting rides. Since the parks now must
adhere to an utmost safety standard, they will risk massive lawsuits unless
they build every ride with the utmost safety. This means that rides with
172. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 344.8 (d)(2)(A) (2001).
173. Id. § 344.9(a).
174. Id. § 344.9(c).
175. See Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125 (2005).
176. See generally Zoltak, supra note 23.
177. See Sophia Banay, World's Most Fun Amusement Parks 2005, FORBES, May 26, 2005,
available at http://www.forbes.con2005/0/travel/2005/05/26/cx-sb0526feat.html.
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two hundred-foot drops should not be built since rides with fifty-foot drops
are safer. In fact, perhaps rides with no drops should be built since that is
even safer! Attractions that hit speeds of one hundred miles per hour
should be slowed down to fifty miles per hour since that is safer. Plainly,
these new rides will not attract a public that is looking for bigger thrills
every year. Visitors will likely ferry their tourist dollars elsewhere as a
California elevator-drop ride will simply turn into just an elevator. The
public will not pay for a ride in an elevator.
Amusement park visitors, which totaled 328 million nationwide in
2004, will spend their tourist dollars in other states. 178 Just before Gomez v.
Disney was heard by the court, Time magazine warned its nationwide
readers that if California alters its standard from reasonable care to utmost
care, the state's amusement parks could have "lower speeds, more
restraints and fewer thrills. ' 179  This could create poor publicity for
California theme parks which will in turn hurt tourism. Not only will gate
revenues drop, but the twenty billion dollars the theme park industry and
related businesses generate for the state, including tourist spending at
hotels, restaurants, transportation, and retail stores 80 will plummet with it.
Additionally, California's insurance costs for amusement parks will
now substantially increase. As a result of Gomez, operators of thrill rides
are now insurers of their patrons.' 8' Since thrill rides are inherently
dangerous and therefore could always be safer, the court's ruling forces
liability on amusement parks for any incident that might occur. These cost
increases will either pass on to the consumer in increased ticket prices or
become absorbed by the amusement park. Either way, the effect of this
increase puts California at a disadvantageous position versus parks in other
states.
2. The Court's Language "Roller Coasters and Other Similar Attractions"
Creates Excessive Vagueness, Leaving Amusement Park Liability for Non-
Roller Coasters in the Dark
With this decision, operators of amusement parks will lack a clear
understanding of the liability for attractions other than roller coasters in
their own park. The plain language of the opinion states that roller coasters
178. Zimmerman, supra note 24.
179. Jeanne McDowell, Thrill Rides: Headedfor a Slowdown?, TIME, Dec. 15, 2003, at 21.
180. California Attraction & Parks Association, Welcome to CAPA, http://www.capalink.
org (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
181. Gomez v. Super Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1148 (2005) (Chin, J.,
dissenting).
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and other similar attractions can be common carriers, but never defines or
explains what is included in "other dissimiliar, amusement rides.' 82  A
roller coaster is defined as a "steep, sharply curving elevated railway with
small open passenger cars that is operated at high speeds as a ride,
especially in an amusement park."'' 83 The question remains whether only
rides with railways and high speeds are considered similar attractions, or,
whether the court considers attractions that offer similar thrills to be
common carriers. Hypothetically, a large Ferris Wheel, which might be
considered more prone to causing injuries than a typical roller coaster,
might not be a common carrier, leaving major liability questions
unanswered.
As the liability questions increase, so do the costs of insurance.
Wayne Pielre, a lawyer who represents amusement park industry interests,
filed an amicus brief co-signed by the International Association of
Amusement Parks and Attractions, which stated that "exposing operators to
greater liability could well have an impact on insurance premiums.... 184
California's businesses, from parks with million-dollar roller coasters to
bars with mechanical bulls, will face higher premiums. 85 The President
and Chief Executive Officer of Hans & Wilkerson Insurance, which
provides insurance coverage to over thirty small U.S. amusement parks,
stated that premiums for the amusement park industry are dependent upon
factors such as revenue, number of rides, and previous loss experience at a
particular park. 186 The President also stated that parks are covered by
general liability insurance, 187 "[b]ut because of liability exposure, very few
companies are willing to underwrite these risks."'' 88 Due to the increased
exposure in California, even fewer companies will underwrite these risks.
Therefore, should a fatality or serious injury occur, many of the smaller
parks will not be insured and will unlikely be able to afford the damages.
E. A Majority of Courts Have Adamantly Opposed Categorizing Thrill
Rides as Common Carriers
1. Most States Hold Amusement Ride Operators to an Extraordinary
182. Id.
183. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1510 (4th ed.
2000).
184. Zoltak, supra note 46, at 41.
185. Id.
186. Banay, supra note 177.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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Diligence Standard
As mentioned earlier, the majority of courts that have ruled on this
issue have held that the care required of amusement ride operators is the
care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the
circumstances. 89 This section will discuss the means whereby various
states handle the classification of amusement parks as common carriers.
The Supreme Court of Georgia unanimously held in Harlan v. Six
Flags Over Georgia that ordinary care is the standard of care owed by the
operator of a thrill ride.1901n Harlan, a patron paid a fare to enter the
Atlanta amusement park and subsequently became injured while riding a
device called "The Wheelie."' 9' Plaintiff contended that the "operator of
an amusement device.., must exercise extraordinary diligence to protect
the lives and persons of its passengers" (emphasis added). 192 The plaintiff
claimed that the thrill ride is akin to a common carrier' 93 and thus faces a
higher standard of care, as called for in the Georgia statute.' 94 The court
rejected this contention.195 "We find it easy to distinguish between [the]
operation of elevators, taxicabs, buses, and railroads, which are instruments
of transportation that must be used by people to travel from one place to
another, and operation of 'The Wheelie' and similar instruments, which are
not." 196 The court further opined that expectations are different for riders
of an elevator, who look for a smooth mode of transportation, and riders of
a thrill ride, who "seek a sensation of speed and movement for the sake of
entertainment and thrills."'197 Surely, a Georgia court would recognize that
patrons who dare to venture onto the Indiana Jones ride seek the same
"sensation of speed and movement for the sake of entertainment, ' 98 as
opposed to a smooth mode of transportation. Hence, similar to
classification of the Wheelie, a Georgia court would hold that the Indiana
Jones ride is not a common carier.
189. See supra text accompanying note 100.
190. Harlan v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 297 S.E.2d 468, 469 (Ga. 1982).
191. Id. at 468.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 469.
194. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-201, 18-204.
195. Harlan, 297 S.E 2d at 469.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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In Texas, the courts have long held that amusement rides are held to
an ordinary standard of care, and are not common carriers.1 99 In a recent
Texas case, Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. v. Doris Graf Elmer, the court dealt
with whether the operator of a speedboat that carries paying patrons on a
"THRILL SCREAMING" ride through the Gulf of Mexico for pleasure, as
opposed to for transportation purposes, is a common carrier. 200 The trial
court held that the speedboat is not a common carrier. 20 1 This holding was
reversed by the Court of Appeal.20 2 Finally, the case came before the
highest court in Texas, which held that the "thrilling" ride was akin to an
amusement park ride, and therefore did not constitute a common carrier.20 3
The court opined that when determining whether a party who engages in
the transportation of patrons is a common carrier, the court looks to the
party's primary function.2°
For an entity to be a common carrier, it must be determined that the
"business of the entity is public transportation, and not transportation" that
is "only incidental" to its primary business. 205 In Speed Boat Leasing, for
example, the boat owner's primary purpose was to entertain passengers,
and not to transport them from place to place. 20 6 In fact, the transportation
of passengers was only incidental to its main goal of "supply[ing]
passengers with an exhilarating fun ride., 20 7 Thus, the court held that the
business was not a common carrier.20 8 Similarly, Disneyland's primary
goal behind the Indiana Jones ride is to entertain and thrill the riders, and
not to transport them from one location to another. In Texas, for the
reasons just mentioned, a court would never classify the Indiana Jones ride
as a common carier.
According to a Utah court in Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., a
roller coaster is not a common carrier.20 9 In this case, a child sustained an
injury when the third and fourth cars of a children's roller coaster separated
199. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Harlingen, 112 S.W.2d 1035, 1041 (Tex. 1938); Vance v.
Obadal, 256 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1953).
200. Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. v. Elmer, 124 S.W.3d 210, 211 (Tex. 2003).
201. Id. at 213.
202. Id. at 214.
203. Id. at 213.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 211.
206. Speed Boat Leasing, Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 213.
207. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
208. Id.
209. Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 930-31 (Ut. 1993).
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after a bolt fastening the two cars together failed.2 '0 The injured child sued
the amusement park and asked the court to classify the ride as a common
carrier. 21 1 The court refused, holding "[a]musement rides are not designed
to provide comfortable, uneventful transportation, even when the
equipment operates without incident and as intended. 21 2  Rather,
amusement park rides feature "high speeds, steep drops, and tight turns.
21 3
The court concluded that even though it will not hold thrill rides to a
common carrier standard, "operators of an amusement ride must still
exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and diligence sufficient to assure
that a ride is as safe as is reasonably possible for its passengers.92 14 The
Indiana Jones ride has high speeds, steep drops, and tight turns like those
mentioned in Lamb,21 '5 and should remain outside the common carrier
classification.
In Maryland, the courts have refused to classify entertainment devices
216as common carriers. Instead, it has been held that the purpose of
common carriers is to spur economic growth and guarantee the public a
safe means for their personal transportation.217 In Gunther v. Smith, a
father and son sustained injuries when they were thrown from a horse-
drawn wagon ride after the operator lost control of the horses.21 8  The
injured father and son sued the operator, asserting that the hayride was a
common carrier and therefore the operator owed the highest degree of care
to the passengers. 2 9 The court rejected this argument, holding that the
common carrier standard is reserved for "providing public transportation so
necessary to stimulating the channels of commerce and conveying all
members of the public in their commercial and private pursuits. 2
Maryland has a history of rejecting the common carrier standard for
amusement devices. In 1898, the operator of an amusement balloon ride
was held to the standard of ordinary care. 22' During the early twentieth
century, the court held that an operator of an amusement device that
210. Id. at 928.
211. Id. at 930.
212. Id. at 931.
213. Id. at 930.
214. Id. at 931.
215. Compare Part IV supra, with Lamb, 869 P.2d at 930.
216. Gunther v. Smith, 553 A.2d 1314 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1315.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1316.
221. Smith v. Benick, 41 A. 56, 57 (Md. 1898).
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22dropped patrons through a false floor to a standard of ordinary care.
More recently, in 1956, a Maryland court rejected a common carrier
argument for a roller coaster, holding the operator had a standard of
ordinary care.223
Along the same lines, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Firszt v.
Capitol Park Realty Co., held that a thrill ride does not fall under the
common carrier classification.224 In fact, Connecticut, like Maryland and
other states, has a long history of holding that amusement rides shall not be
classified as common carriers.225 In Firszt, a mother and child rode in
airplane-shaped cars hung by steel cables affixed to a steel support arm.
Once the ride began to rotate, it would elevate the passengers fifteen feet
above the ground.22 6 The airplane-shaped car circled around a tower at
speeds up to twenty-five miles per hour.227 In this particular incident, a rod
holding up the steel support arm broke and the car fell to the ground,
throwing the mother and child out of the car. 8 The court concluded the
rules governing common carriers did not apply to this accident because the
patron of an amusement park ride seeks entertainment, not
transportation. 229  The court held the main reason why common carrier
status does not apply to amusement park rides is that people use public
transportation in everyday life (from planes to elevators), but with
amusement park rides, people choose to partake in the thrilling
experience. 230 The court summed it up succinctly:
One traveling upon his lawful occasions must perforce use the
ordinary means of transportation, and is practically compelled to place
himself in the care of carriers of passengers, and so the rule applied to
carriers holds them to the highest degree of care and diligence. On the
other hand, one desiring for his delectation to make use of pleasure-giving
devices similar to the one in question is under no impulsion of business or
personal necessity. He is seeking entertainment, and when invited by a
manager to avail himself of the equipment provided by certain forms of
amusement, he can properly ask only that he be not exposed by the
222. Carlin v. Smith, 130 A. 340, 342-43 (Md. 1925).
223. Hawk v. Wil-Mar, Inc., 123 A.2d 328, 329 (Md. 1956).
224. Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co., 120 A. 300, 303 (Conn. 1923).
225. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Connecticut Co., 118 A. 446, 447 (Conn. 1922); Bernier v.
Woodstock Agric. Soc'y, 92 A. 160 (Conn. 1914) (holding operators only to a standard of
"reasonable care").
226. Firszt, 120 A. at 302.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 303-04.
230. Id.
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carelessness of those in charge of any given instrumentality to harm
preventable by care appropriate to the operation of such instrumentality.231
In Gomez v. Disney, Moreno embarked on the Indiana Jones ride for
its entertainment value, not for transportation purposes.232 If the incident
occurred in Connecticut, Disney would presumably only be held to a duty
to use reasonable care to bring about and keep the ride reasonably safe for
all patrons.233
Florida has seven of the top ten most-attended amusement parks in
North America.234 In addition, Florida has four of the top ten most-
attended amusement parks in the world, including Magic Kingdom at Walt
Disney World, the number one most-attended theme park in the world with
23515,170,000 guests a year. Obviously, Florida has a bustling amusement
park industry, and special attention should be paid to how its courts treat
negligence liability issues. In Sergermeister v. Recreation Corp. of
America., a minor injured her finger on an attraction called "Lover's
Coach., 236 The Sergermeister court believed that reasonable care is the
standard courts should use and quoted the state's jury instructions on the
matter: "[R]easonable care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful
person would use under like circumstances.'237 The court felt that by
adding "under like circumstances" to jury instructions, the liability of a
specific attraction would go up and down depending on the scale of the
238attraction. For example, a massive roller coaster would have a higher
safety standard than a playground slide on the park's premises. To
illustrate its point, the court stated: "The phrase, 'under like circumstance,'
is akin to a temperature gauge. Thus, the reading, whether high or low,
varies depending on the circumstances., 239 The California court, in Gomez,
should have considered this "under like circumstances" gauge since
absolute classification of all roller coasters and similar attractions as
common carriers creates too high a level of liability on amusement parks.
231. Id. at 635-36.
232. See Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125, 1136 (2005).
233. Firszt, 120 A. at 303.
234. Zoltak, supra note 23, at 16.
235. Id.
236. Sergermeister v. Recreation Corp. of Am,, 314 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
237. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. Id.
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2. Most of the Jurisdictions Cited By the Majority Opinion as Being in
Support Did Not Consider Roller Coasters or Similar Attractions
The majority opinion in Gomez v. Disney has difficulty pointing to
jurisdictions that support its contention that roller coasters and other similar
attractions are common carriers. 240 Of all the jurisdictions in the nation, the
majority points to only four states that held an amusement device as a
common carrier. 24 1 However, upon closer inspection, those opinions did
not always involve roller coasters, but traditional modes of
transportation.242 For example, Gomez cites a Colorado case where the
court classified a stagecoach as a common carrier. 243 In that case, multiple
patrons sustained injuries when an allegedly defective part broke off the
horse-drawn stagecoach.24 4 Although the patrons rode the stagecoach for
amusement purposes, it is still not a "roller coaster or other similar
attraction," but rather a statutorily defined common carrier. 245 The Gomez
court erred in citing this case, since the facts are completely
distinguishable. The victim in Gomez did not ride a stagecoach, which in
California would clearly be classified a common carrier, but rode a thrill
ride.246 While a patron wants a stagecoach to uneventfully travel over some
distance, the patron wants a thrill ride to accelerate, make quick turns,
sudden drops, and ultimately provide an exhilarating experience. The court
in Gomez cited only three states that held roller coasters to be common
carriers, the most recent case dating back to 1931.247
IV. THE SIMPLE SOLUTION FOR LEGISLATURES
For all the reasons mentioned in the previous section, the court clearly
erred in its judgment. To remedy this problem, the legislature should
amend California Civil Code Section 2100 by simply excluding permanent
240. See generally Gomez v. Super. Ct. (Walt Disney Co.), 35 Cal. 4th 1125 (2005).
241. See id. at 1137.
242. Id. at 1135 (citing O'Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005 (11. 1909)).
243. Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1964).
244. Id. at 938.
245. Id. at 947.
246. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1127.
247. See Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co. 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. 1931) (holding
that operators of a roller coaster were held to the degree of care required of common carriers);
Sand Springs Park v. Schrader, 198 P. 983, 987 (Okla. 1921) (operators of a roller coaster were
"bound to use the highest degree of care and caution for the safety of [their] patrons"); Best Park
& Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 68 So. 417, 417-18 (Ala. 1915).
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attractions at fixed-site locations engaged in the business of providing
thrills and entertainment for guests. This exclusion will cover only
permanent attractions at fixed-site amusement parks. "Permanent
attractions" -should be defined broadly as any attraction that is embedded
within the park's grounds. "Fixed-site amusement park" should be defined
as a stationary, commercially-operated enterprise where guests are offered
rides and similar attractions. These definitions will limit the amendment to
fixed-site amusement parks, such as Disneyland and Universal Studios,
and, accordingly, not cover attractions at nomadic recreational areas, such
as carnivals and fairs.
Furthermore, the amendment should define a "ride" as any attraction
where its primary purpose is not to transport passengers from one location
to another. Therefore, transportation devices such as the Disneyland
Parking Tram248 or the Disneyland Monorail 249 will remain common
carriers. These types of attractions meet the statutory definition and
purpose. Every other attraction from a high-speed roller coaster to twirling
teacups will be excluded. Exclusion from the statute will return theme park
operators to an ordinary care standard requiring extraordinary diligence,
which, for the reasons stated in this article, will allow amusement parks to
remain competitive while properly protecting visitors from injury.
VI. EXIT TO YOUR LEFT-CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's opinion in Gomez v. Disney
demonstrates a flawed understanding of California case law and highlights
the importance of statutory interpretation. The court may not interpret laws
based on its own belief as to the safety of thrill rides. Rather, when a
statute is not clear on its face, the court should rule based on the statute's
legislative history, precedent from the state's case law, and persuasive
authority from the vast majority of other jurisdictions. This court failed to
correctly utilize any of these vehicles when deciding Gomez v. Disney.
250
248. See Intercot West, Disneyland Inside & Out, http://www.intercotwest.cor/resortGuide/
parking.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Intercot West]. The Disneyland Parking
Tram is a service provided by the Anaheim park that loads and unloads passengers at parking
structures, or parking lots, and then transports the passengers to a loading/unloading spot near the
park's entrance.
249. See Intercot West, supra note 248 (stating that although Disneyland lists the Monorail
as an attraction, its primary purpose is to transport guests from Disney's hotel to a loading and
unloading site inside the park).
250. Gomez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1125.
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For these reasons, the California Legislature should amend the
common carrier statute to exclude roller coasters and other similar
attractions at fixed-site amusement parks. By doing so, the legislature will
not only rescue the state's amusement parks, but also the twenty billion
dollars in commerce the parks generate per year. Most importantly, it will
continue to protect the safety of patrons at amusement parks. After the
court's wrong turn, the state legislature now should step in and put the state
back on track.
Jeffrey S. Goodfried
* This Comment would never have happened if not for the guidance and assistance of Anne
Braveman, my Note and Comment Editor, Professor David Tunick, and the staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review. Also, special thanks to my fianc6e, Heather Golick, for
her love and support while I spent so many nights at the library to put this article together.
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